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One of the most important developments in international ﬁnance and resource economics
in the past twenty years is the rapid and widespread emergence of the $6 trillion
sovereign wealth fund industry. Oil exporters typically ignore below-ground assets when
allocating these funds, and ignore above-ground assets when extracting oil. We present a
uniﬁed stylized framework for considering both. Subsoil oil should alter a fund’s portfolio
through additional leverage and hedging. First-best spending should be a share of total
wealth, and any unhedgeable volatility must be managed by precautionary savings. If oil
prices are pro-cyclical, oil should be extracted faster than the Hotelling rule to generate a
risk premium on oil wealth. Finally, we discuss how our analysis could improve the
management of Norway’s fund in practice.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since 1994 the number of sovereign wealth funds has nearly quadrupled to 73 (SWF institute, 2013). These funds hold
some of the largest portfolios in the world and globally account for over $6 trillion in assets (ibid.). Two thirds of the
sovereign wealth fund industry (by size) has been funded by selling below-ground assets such as oil, natural gas, copper and
diamonds (“oil” for short). These funds often comprise a large part of commodity exporters’ wealth. Azerbaijan’s US$ 34
billion fund accounts for almost half its GDP, Qatar’s US$ 170 billion fund accounts for almost two thirds of GDP, Saudi
Arabia’s US$ 740 billion funds are approximately four-ﬁfths of GDP, Norway’s US$ 840 billion fund is nearly one and a halfer B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
rnland, Gordon Clark, Robert Cairns, Remy Cottet, Julien Daubanes, Gerard Gaudet, Espen Henriksen,
tephen Salant, Anthony Smith, Kjetil Storesletten and seminar participants at the Norges Bank, the
nference, the 2013 AERE conference, the 2014 WCERE conference, the 2014 SURED conference, the
unich, ANU, UNSW, Monash and the University of Sydney for helpful comments. We are also very
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IMF, 2013).
The purpose of these funds is to smooth consumption of oil income: across generations because oil reserves are ﬁnite,
and between periods because oil and asset prices are volatile. While such funds are professionally managed and often
allocate their assets using modern portfolio theory, we argue that their investment strategies do not take due account of oil
price volatility and subsoil reserves. Similarly, existing theories of optimal oil extraction do not take into account volatile
ﬁnancial markets. These are important issues for resource exporters, since commodity prices are notoriously volatile and
below-ground assets can be worth much more than the above-ground fund.
Our aim is therefore to answer four questions about how below-ground resources should inﬂuence above-ground
portfolios, and vice-versa. Firstly, how should one allocate above-ground assets given a volatile stock of below-ground
assets? Secondly, how quickly should ﬁnancial and oil wealth be consumed? Thirdly, how does this change if ﬁnancial
markets are incomplete, so that oil shocks cannot be completely hedged in the portfolio? Finally, how should the optimal
extraction rate of below-ground assets be affected by risky above-ground assets?
We will show that policy-makers should adjust their above-ground portfolios to accommodate the volatility and erosion
of below-ground oil stocks (hedging and leverage effects respectively); consume a ﬁxed share of total wealth; manage
shocks that cannot be hedged with precautionary savings; and, if the marginal rent from extracting an additional barrel of
oil, namely the oil price minus marginal extraction costs, co-varies positively with average equity market returns, then oil
should be extracted faster.
Our analysis combines three large and previously unrelated strands of literature. Firstly, the allocation of ﬁnancial assets
is described by CAPM equations modiﬁed for subsoil oil wealth. This extends the continuous-time analysis of optimal
consumption-saving and portfolio choice (Merton, 1990).1 Secondly, consumption is described by a stochastic Euler
equation,2 extending the literature on prudence and precautionary savings to the case when both ﬁnancial assets and oil
extraction can be chosen.3 Thirdly, the optimal rate of oil extraction is described by a stochastic Hotelling rule modiﬁed if the
proceeds of extraction of below-ground wealth are invested in a risky above-ground ﬁnancial portfolio.4 Our intended
contribution is to introduce a stylized framework that combines canonical insights from all three of these ﬁelds. These
insights would be modiﬁed by including transaction costs and illiquidity premiums, which would help to explain why in
practice fund managers do not adjust their portfolios too frequently by introducing some mean reversion into the portfolio
decisions (Constantinides, 1986; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2013; Jong and Driessen, 2015).
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 introduces our model for portfolio choice, saving and oil revenues. Section 3
shows how to allow for below-ground oil wealth with a predetermined path for oil production when the oil price is
completely spanned by returns in asset markets. Section 4 deals with the case of investment restrictions which prevent the
oil price being fully spanned. Section 5 derives the optimal path for oil extraction. Section 6 discusses the implications of our
results and compares these with the policies adopted by the Norwegian fund. Finally, Section 7 concludes and qualiﬁes our
results.2. The model
Adopting Geometric Brownian motion processes for the oil price and asset returns, the problem is to choose the rate of
public consumption C and portfolio asset weights wi, i¼1,.., n, to maximize the expected present value of utility with
discount rate ρ40:
JðF; PO; tÞ ¼max
C;wi
Et
Z 1
t
U CðsÞð Þeρðs tÞds
 
; ð1Þ
subject to the budget constraint:
dF ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiðαirÞFdtþðrFþPOOCÞdtþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiFσidZi; ð2Þ1 This builds on classic portfolio theory (Tobin, 1958) and mean-variance theory (Markowitz, 1952; 1959). If investors have equal information and
markets are complete, they hold the market portfolio as used in the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964). Our extension to allow for oil income is akin to those dealing
with a non-tradable stream of income in the context of university endowments (Merton, 1993; Brown and Tiu, 2012), labor income including endogenous
effort (Bodie et al., 1992; Wang et al., 2013), non-tradable and uninsurable income (Svensson and Werner, 1993; Koo, 1998) and non-ﬁnancial stores of
wealth such as housing (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Sinai and Souleles, 2005; Case et al., 2005).
2 See Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970), Zeldes (1986), Kimball (1990), Carroll and Kimball (2008).
3 This extends earlier work on precautionary saving in safe assets to cope with oil price volatility (Bems and de Carvalho Filho, 2011; van den Bremer
and van der Ploeg, 2013).
4 We require marginal extraction costs to be positive and increasing in the amount extracted but, unlike Pindyck (1980, 1981), we do not require them
to be convex, which would create extractive prudence. Others treat extraction with stochastic oil prices, growth and capital, but abstract from above-
ground ﬁnancial assets (Gaudet and Khadr, 1991; Atewamba and Gaudet, 1992). Recent empirical evidence suggests that the Hotelling rule holds at the
extensive margin of number of wells drilled, but not at the intensive margin (Anderson et al., 2014; Venables, 2014).
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at time t, OðtÞ; either declines exponentially at the rate κwith zero extraction costs (Sections 3 and 4)6 or is chosen optimally
with convex costs (Section 5). The fund has m risky assets, i¼1,.., m, with drift αi and volatility σi and one safe asset, i¼mþ1,
with return r and volatility σmþ1 ¼0. There are thus n  m þ1 assets. The fund holds Ni shares of assets, i¼1,.., n, each with
price Pi, so F ¼
Pn
i ¼ 1 PiNi:The share of each asset in the fund is wi  PiNi=F;so F ¼
Pn
i ¼ 1wiF: The stochastic processes for the
risky assets are:
dPi ¼ αiPidtþσiPidZi; i¼ 1; ::;m; ð3Þ
where dZi is a Wiener process with cov(dZi dZj) ¼ [ρij] for i¼1,.., m. The returns of risky assets have covariance matrix
Σ ¼ ½σij ¼ ½ρijσiσj. We abstract from mean reversion and stochastic volatility in asset prices, and ignore transaction costs
(discussed in Section 6). We thus assume that the coefﬁcients in (3) are constant. The weight of the safe asset in the fund,
wn ¼ 1
Pm
i ¼ 1 wi; is positive or negative if the weight of the risky portfolio is smaller or larger than one, which corresponds
to a long position (wn 4 0) or short position (wn o 0) in the safe asset. Total holdings of risky assets is called the “portfolio”,
ð1wnÞF ¼
Pm
i ¼ 1 wiF; and its share in the fund is w 1wn:
Preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion, UðCÞ ¼ C11=θ=ð11=θÞ; θa1and UðCÞ ¼ lnðCÞ; θ¼ 1;where θ is the
coefﬁcient of intertemporal substitution, 1/θ the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion or the degree of intergenerational
inequality aversion, and 1 þ 1/θ the coefﬁcient of relative prudence. These are a member of the class of hyperbolic absolute
risk aversion preferences and thus permit an analytical solution to the asset allocation problem (Merton, 1971). Section 3
also explores Epstein-Zin preferences, which allows one to disentangle risk aversion and intertemporal substitution (Epstein
and Zin, 1989; Dufﬁe and Epstein, 1992).7
The country is a small oil exporter that does not affect the oil price. The world oil price also follows a Geometric
Brownian Motion process:
dPO ¼ αOPOdtþσOPOdZO; ð4Þ
where the drift in the oil price is not too large, αOor:8 Again, we abstract from mean reversion, stochastic volatility and
transaction costs. Risky assets are driven by a common set of shocks (e.g., to demand, supply, technology or the weather), du
 i.i.d. N(0, dt). The correlation of each asset depends on how it is affected by these shocks, dZ ¼ Λdu; where Λ¼ λij
 
is an
invertible mmmatrix and dZ ¼ dZ1; ::; dZm
 
' is the vector of Wiener processes driving the returns on risky assets. The
Wiener process driving oil returns is expressed as:
dZO ¼ λOhduhþΛOdu¼ λOhduhþMdZ; ð5Þ
where M¼ ΛOΛ1. The vector ΛO ¼ [λO1, .., λOm] determines how the oil price responds to the vector of underlying
shocks, du, and covðdZO; dZÞ ¼ ΣM:9
With complete markets, the fund has unrestricted access to all assets and the instantaneous return on oil can be perfectly
replicated (“spanned”) by a bundle of traded securities. Without loss of generality these securities represent equities and
bonds rather than derivatives.10 The unhedgeable component of oil prices is zero, λOh ¼ 0 (see Sections 3 and 5). With
incomplete markets, there is an unhedgeable component of the oil price with weight λOh ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1Pm1i ¼ 1 λOiq a0 and
ΛO ¼ λO1; ::; λOm1½ ; where duh is a residual oil-speciﬁc shock that is uncorrelated with the asset market shocks, du (see
appendix A.1 and Section 4).3. Complete markets and a given path of oil extraction
With complete markets, oil wealth can be treated as tradable by replicating its properties with a synthetic bundle of
traded ﬁnancial assets. Accordingly, an arbitrage argument can be employed to derive the value of the stream of oil revenues
(see appendix A.1. for a derivation):
VðPO; tÞ ¼ POðtÞOðtÞ=ψ ; ψ  rþκαOþ
Xm
i ¼ 1 βiðαirÞ; ð6Þ
where βi ¼ σOσi ½ΛOΛ
1iand Mi  ½ΛOΛ1i. Total wealth, W ¼ FþV ; then satisﬁes:
dW ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiWðαirÞdtþðrWCÞdtþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
σiwiWdZi; ð7Þ5 This abstracts from all other public assets (e.g., future tax revenues) and liabilities (e.g., pensions).
6 The results can readily be extended for the case of a constant windfall of ﬁnite duration.
7 These have been used in empirical studies (e.g., Attanasio and Weber, 1989; Wang et al., 2013).
8 This is a sufﬁcient condition for the present discounted value of a permanent oil windfall to be ﬁnite, and is consistent with empirical estimates (e.g.,
van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2013).
9 Oil prices depend in general equilibrium on more fundamental shocks (Bodenstein et al., 2012).
10 For large oil exporters, liquidity constraints make derivative hedging of oil prices impractical. Therefore we focus on long/short, equity/bond hedging
strategies.
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The replicating bundle linearly combines exposures βi to many ﬁnancial assets, which depend on the correlation of each
risky asset with the oil price and its uniqueness amongst other ﬁnancial assets. This bundle matches the variance of oil
revenues and the amount of the safe asset is chosen to match the drift. Oil wealth is current oil revenues divided by the
effective discount rate ψ, where ψ is the safe return r plus the rate of decline of oil production κ minus the drift in the oil
price αO plus the adjustment to compensate risk-averse investors for bearing oil price risk.11 Oil wealth reacts to the current
oil price only, as (5) implies oil price shocks are permanent under our assumptions.
3.1. Asset allocation: leverage and hedging demands
If claims to oil can be securitized, the proceeds can be invested in a diversiﬁed portfolio and the problem reduces to that
in Merton (1990). In practice, doing so may be difﬁcult due to political and practical constraints12. Nevertheless, with the
replicating bundle the problem reduces to choosing the net weight of each risky asset, wi for i¼1,.., m, in total above- and
below-ground wealth, W¼F þ V. Evidently, the net weight of each risky asset in total wealth is constant:
wi ¼ δiw; i¼ 1…m; δi 
1
v
Xm
j ¼ 1
vijðαjrÞ; ð8Þ
and the net weight of all risky assets in total wealth is:
w
Xm
i ¼ 1
wi ¼ θν; v
Xm
i ¼ 1
Xm
j ¼ 1
vijðαjrÞ; ð9Þ
where νij  Σ1
 
ij; and the share of safe assets in the total portfolio is 1w:
The weight of each risky asset in the above-ground fund is (see appendix A.2):
wi ¼wiþ wi
V
F
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
leverage demand
þ βi
V
F
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
hedging demand
; βi ¼ σOσi Mi; i¼ 1; ::;m: ð10Þ
Sovereign wealth funds should thus be structured so that net exposure to each asset in total wealth is constant. The
optimal portfolio of risky assets (8) is independent of preferences and the level of wealth, but depends as usual on the drift
and covariance of asset returns. The optimal part of total wealth allocated to risky assets (9) is proportional to the overall
risk-adjusted return of the portfolio v and the willingness to take risk θ (the inverse of the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion).13
To ensure that net exposure to each ﬁnancial asset is a constant share of total wealth (8), one requires offsetting leverage
and hedging demands for each risky asset as a share of the above-ground fund (10). The allocation of the fund approaches its
non-oil level, wi, as oil is depleted.
14 Leverage demand involves holding more of each risky asset in the above-ground fund.
For example, if oil wealth matches the size of the fund and is uncorrelated with assets (βi ¼ 0; 8 i, W ¼ FþV ¼ 2F), the fund
holds twice as much of each risky asset and can do so only by holding less or borrowing more of the risk-free asset. If there
is only one risky asset, leverage demand is given by the Sharpe ratio, θðα1rÞσ21 ðV=FÞ15, clearly illustrating that, as oil is
depleted, leverage demand vanishes by reallocating from risky to safe assets.
Furthermore, hedging demand offsets exposure to oil price risk. If oil is correlated with only one asset, dZO ¼ ρOkdZk,
hedging demand is the oil-asset beta16 multiplied by the leverage ratio, ρOkσO=σkðV=FÞ. If oil price risk is positively cor-
related with the ﬁnancial asset (ρOk40), hedging demand is negative. If the two are negatively correlatedðρOko0Þ;the fund
should hold more of the risky asset to hedge oil price risk. Again, as oil is extracted and the exposure to price risk falls,
hedging demand vanishes. Eq. (10) generalizes this insight to multiple risky ﬁnancial assets. If all ﬁnancial asset returns are
independent (Λ is diagonal), oil should be hedged by investing more in assets that are negatively correlated (e.g., assets that
use oil as an input such as manufacturing and consumer goods industries) and less in assets that are positively correlated
(e.g., oil and gas stocks or substitutes like renewable energy), especially if oil reserves are large. One should then also
leverage up all demands for risky assets that prevail in the absence of oil. If ﬁnancial asset returns are correlated, hedging of
oil must consider the covariance of each risky asset. It is then possible that the fund should invest less in assets that are11 The value of an uncertain stream of income follows from discounting at the risk-free rate if the probability space is adjusted to a risk-neutral
measure using a theorem due to Girsanov (1960).
12 Politicians do not like the prospect of having sold oil for an ex-post low price, and risk-averse ﬁrms are unwilling to take on all price and
production risk
13 If there is only one risky asset, (9) reduces to the Sharpe ratio, w¼ θðα1rÞ=σ21 ;so the portfolio is proportional to the excess return of the risky asset
over the safe asset, and the willingness to take risk, and inversely proportional to the variance of the return on the risky asset. With multiple risky assets
the overall risk-adjusted return is lower if assets are positively correlated, so there is less scope for ﬂuctuations to offset each other and to hedge oil.
14 This assumes that withdrawals from the fund are not so rapacious (i.e., ρ is not too high, cf. (8)) that fund assets fall quicker than oil is extracted and
V/F rises over time.
15 Mean-variance analysis gives a similar expression (Gintschel and Scherer, 2008; Scherer, 2009).
16 The slope coefﬁcient of a regression of demeaned asset returns versus demeaned oil returns.
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index”, βi, constructed to replicate movements in the oil price. Over time the mix shifts from the second to the ﬁrst index as
oil is extracted from the ground (see (10)). Net demand may be negative for both risky assets (short positions) and riskless
assets (leverage), which may not be practical for many SWFs. Section 4 addresses this by considering investment
restrictions.
3.2. Consumption rules and precautionary saving
Oil wealth also affects precautionary saving and optimal consumption from the fund, as illustrated by the Euler equation
governing the expected growth of consumption:
1
dt Et dC
 
C
¼ θðrρÞþ1
2
ð1þ1=θÞσW2w2; σW 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃXm
i ¼ 1
Xm
j ¼ 1 δiδjσij
r
: ð11Þ
With complete markets, a closed-form solution for optimal consumption exists (Merton, 1990):
C ¼MPC UW ; MPC  rþθðρrÞþ1
2
θ 1θð Þ αWr
σW
 2
; αW 
Xm
i ¼ 1 δiαi; ð12Þ
where the drift and the volatility of total wealth are αW and σW and total wealth also follows a Geometric Brownian
Motion process:
dW ¼ αWWdtþσWwWdZW ; αW  ðαWrÞwþrMPC: ð13Þ
The aggregate volatility of total wealth when portfolio weights are optimised is a weighted average of the volatility of
each asset, dZW ¼ 1σW
Pm
i ¼ 1 δiσidZi, and (13) has a solution WðtÞ ¼Wð0Þexp αWσ2Ww2=2

 
tþσWwZW ðtÞ
h i
.
Aggregate risk is managed by depressing consumption today to build a precautionary buffer of assets, as seen from the
upward tilt of the expected consumption path in the ﬁnal term of (11). The degree of tilt increases with the coefﬁcient of
relative prudence (1 þ 1/θ), the riskiness of the portfolio σ2W , and the size of the risky portfolio in total wealth, w: The buffer
compensates future periods for bearing additional risk, but does not temporarily support consumption when asset prices are
low, as here asset price shocks are random walks and thus persistent.
The optimal spending path can be achieved with a rule that consumes a ﬁxed proportion of below and above-ground
wealth, (12). The proportion is affected by a higher return on the safe asset through the intertemporal substitution effect
(negative as future consumption has become cheaper) and the income effect (positive as lifetime wealth has gone up). The
former dominates the latter if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, θ, exceeds one. From (12) we see that the marginal
propensity to consume, MPC, decreases with the return on the safe asset, r, and the average excess return on risky assets,
αWr; and increases with relative risk aversion, 1/θ, and fund volatility, σW . The proportion of total wealth consumed each
period, MPC, should be less than its expected return re ¼wαWþð1wÞr, so that both consumption and wealth rise over
time.18 The amount depends on prudence, as MPCre ¼  1=2
 
1þ1=θ w2σ2W , where 1þ1=θ is the coefﬁcient of relative
prudence and we have set r¼ ρ. This precautionary savings builds up a buffer of assets against future risk (Kimball, 1990)
with absolute risk aversion, θ/C, falling as consumption rises.
With uncertain oil and asset prices and r¼ρ, we observe from (13) how total above- and below-ground wealth evolves
over time.19 It rises due to the premium earned on risky assets, αWZr. It falls (rises) if the intertemporal substitution effect
is dominated by the income effect in consumption20 with the extent depending on the risk/return trade-off of total wealth,
θ 1θð Þ ðαWrÞ=σW
 2
=2.
3.3. Intergenerational equity and risk aversion: Epstein-Zin preferences
To capture intergenerational concerns relevant for the long investment horizons of sovereign wealth funds, it is
important to separate the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, CRRA, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, EIS or
the coefﬁcient of relative intergenerational inequality aversion, IIA ¼ 1/EIS (Epstein and Zin, 1989). Restricting attention to
one risky and one safe ﬁnancial asset, we can show that the share of risky assets in total wealth and consumption are
w¼ αrð Þ= σ2CRRA  and C ¼ EIS ρþð1EISÞ rþðαrÞ2= 2CRRAσ2 h i
 W (see appendix A.4). These expressions extend
17 For example, consider a shock duG which affects oil and asset A but not others, λOG, λAG 4 0 and λiG ¼ 0, for all i a A. The other shocks duj affect oil
and asset A in opposite ways, λOj 4 0 and λAj o 0, j ¼ 1,.., m. It is then possible that oil and asset A are negatively correlated,
Pm
j ¼ 1 λOjλAjo0, but the fund
should nevertheless invest less in asset A to offset the exposure to shock G. The allocation of all other assets will have to adjust to hedge the effects of the
remaining shocks, duj for j a g.
18 Optimal consumption is a ﬁxed share of total wealth, but also incorporates precautionary saving. Oil is valued at a heavy discount rate but after
extraction is replaced with less discounted ﬁnancial assets, so the value of total wealth and consumption rises over time. Norway takes this to the limit,
inﬁnitely discounting future oil revenues and consuming only a ﬁxed share of ﬁnancial assets (see Section 6).
19 Without oil or asset price uncertainty and r ¼ ρ, any drop in below-ground wealth must be exactly compensated for by an increase in above-ground
wealth to fully smooth consumption (Hartwick, 1977).
20 That is, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution θ is less (greater) than unity.
T. van den Bremer et al. / European Economic Review 82 (2016) 113–131118(8) and (12) by departing from EIS ¼ 1/CRRA ¼ 1/IIA¼ θ. If EIS ¼ 1, the intertemporal substitution and income effects cancel
out, so that the propensity to consume is independent of r, C=F ¼ ρ: If EIS 4 1 or IIA o 1, intertemporal substitution
dominates and the risk-adjusted return in square brackets negatively impacts the propensity to consume. If EIS o 1, the
income effect dominates and the risk-adjusted return increases the propensity to consume. The Euler equation becomes
1=dt
 
Et dC
 ¼ EISU rρð ÞþEISUCRRAUCRP Uw2σ2=2 C; where the coefﬁcient of relative prudence equals CRP ¼ 1 þ 1/EIS ¼
1 þ IIA for these preferences.4. Investment restrictions and a given path of oil extraction
4.1. Additional precautionary saving
Many funds restrict investment in certain asset classes for social and political reasons.21 This is a form of incomplete
markets which prevents the oil price being replicated by a bundle of traded ﬁnancial securities. To illustrate this, assume
that the fund cannot invest in a particular asset, so λOha0 in (5) and the oil price is not fully spanned. In that case, there
must be additional precautionary saving to cope with residual volatility.22 With investment restrictions, the Euler equation
can be approximated by (see appendix A.3):
1
dt Et dC
 
C
¼ θðrρÞþ1
2
ð1þ1=θÞ σ2Ww2þλ2Ohσ2O
V
W
 2" #
; ð14Þ
where w is given in (9) and σW in (11). Total wealth evolves according to:
dW ¼
Xm1
i ¼ 1 wiWðαirÞþβhðαhrÞþrWC

 
dtþσM
Xm1
i ¼ 1 wiWdZiþσOλOhVduO: ð15Þ
Hence, investment restrictions have both a precautionary and a wealth effect on consumption. The former arises as
unspanned risk cannot be hedged optimally, whereas the latter because investment in a speciﬁc asset yielding high or
low returns is not possible, as such an asset simply does not exist or investment in it is prohibited. Asset weights adjust
to ﬁnd the closest replicating bundle leaving only uncorrelated residual risk (see also appendix A.1.). The precautionary
effect describes the additional savings needed because some oil price risk remains unhedged as in (14). The ﬁrst term on
the right-hand side is the usual slope of optimal consumption. The second term captures precautionary saving and is
proportional to the coefﬁcient of relative prudence, CRP ¼ (1 þ 1/θ). The term σ2Ww2 inside the square brackets arises
from the precautionary saving needed under complete markets when all oil price volatility is fully diversiﬁed. It is
proportional to the variance of the portfolio of risky assets and the share of risky assets in the fund squared. The new
term λ2Ohσ
2
O V=W
 2 arises from the precautionary saving that is required if not all oil price volatility can be fully hedged.
Less spanning of the oil price (a higherλOh) implies that more precautionary saving is required, especially if oil wealth is
volatile and comprises a large share of total wealth. Evidently, this effect diminishes as oil reserves are depleted and the
ratio of V and W diminishes.
The wealth effect describes the change in the expected return on total wealth from not investing in a particular asset (see
(15)). If an asset cannot be held by the fund (cf. asset h in (15)), there is still some exposure to it embodied in the oil price.
With complete markets this exposure is offset inside the fund, so the net exposure is a constant share of total wealth. With
incomplete markets this net exposure cannot be fully offset and will earn a rate of return, changing the expected return on
total wealth. Its importance will diminish as oil reserves are depleted.
4.2. Stylized illustration of oil-CAPM model
We now illustrate how a sovereign wealth fund is affected by the presence of subsoil oil, depending on whether
or not it has access to hedging assets. We suppose that there is a risk-free asset, r, and two risky assets: 1
uncorrelated with the oil price (the market asset) and 2 perfectly negatively correlated with the oil price (the hedging
asset).23 To ensure the latter asset is used for hedging only, we assume it has a zero excess return. This focuses our
attention on the precautionary effect (and sets the wealth effect to zero). Fig. 1 ﬁrst gives the declining expected paths
of oil revenues and oil wealth and their 95% conﬁdence bounds.
With complete markets there is leverage demand for both risky assets and a hedging demand for asset 2 that is nega-
tively correlated with the oil price, as illustrated by the continuous lines in Fig. 2. These demands for each risky asset begin
large but fall as oil reserves are depleted (cf. wiV=F) and exposure to oil prices diminishes.21 For example, Norway’s fund does not invest in tobacco, military or coal assets amongst others.
22 Earlier work ignored risky ﬁnancial assets, an extreme case of incomplete markets (van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2013). Here we have risky
assets too, but still allow for incomplete markets.
23 We set F(0)¼100, r¼ρ¼0.03, θ ¼ 0.5 (or θ ¼ 0.2 when indicated) , Pi(0) ¼ 1, σi ¼ 0.02, ρij ¼0 for i,j¼[A,B]; α1 ¼ 0.07, α2 ¼0.03, S(0)¼100, O(0) ¼ 10,
κ¼ 0.1, αO ¼ 0 and σO ¼ 0.25.
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Fig. 1. Exogenous oil rents and the value of oil.
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Fig. 2. Portfolio allocation without investment restrictions (solid) and with a ban on investing in the hedging asset 2 (dashed).
T. van den Bremer et al. / European Economic Review 82 (2016) 113–131 119To buy enough of risky asset 2 to fully hedge the oil price, the fund needs to borrow (“short”) the risk-free asset. Without
oil half of the fund is invested in the risky market asset and the other half in the risk-free asset: w1 ¼ 0:5;w2 ¼ 0;wr ¼ 0:5.
Increasing the coefﬁcient of risk aversion will only reduce the demand for the market asset, leaving the hedging demand
unchanged, from Eq. (10) and as can be seen from comparing panels (a) and (b).
Fig. 3 indicates that the consumption path is smoothed in face of declining and volatile oil revenues and grows in line
with total above- and below-ground wealth to reﬂect precautionary saving. As oil wealth is run down (red dotted line in
panel (b)), the fund is built up (blue dotted line) reﬂecting the basic insight that total wealth should grow at the same
constant rate, if the oil price is completely spanned.
Investment restrictions: incomplete markets
Now consider the situationwhere the fund is prevented from investing in the risky hedging asset 2 or, equivalently, going
short in an asset that correlates positively with the oil price. The dashed lines in Fig. 2 describe the case with investment
restrictions, and indicate that the portfolio weight of the uncorrelated asset 1 is unaffected by restrictions on investing in the
hedging asset (see (8)). The difference arises merely from the change in the drift of the fund F due to the precautionary effect
discussed below. By restricting investment in the hedging asset (or, equivalently, preventing short positions in an asset that
is positively correlated with the oil price), there is less need to borrow the safe asset (assuming pure hedging assets with
zero excess return as in the numerical illustration, thus avoiding wealth effects). Residual volatility will then be managed by
additional precautionary savings.
The effect of incomplete markets on consumption is illustrated by Fig. 4 for the case CRP ¼3 (CRRA ¼ 2). Although not
having access to the hedging asset (with zero excess return) does not have a direct effect on the expected evolution of total
wealth, it leaves the consumer subject to additional now unhedgeable risk calling for additional precautionary savings. It is
clear from panel (a) that initial consumption has to drop in favor of consumption at later times. This effect is larger for larger
degrees of prudence, from Eq. (14). Panel (b) shows optimal consumption as a share of total wealth. If oil price risk cannot be
hedged due to incomplete markets or investment prohibitions, the share of consumption in total wealth is no longer
constant.
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The optimal speed of extracting oil may be understood using the Hotelling rule. This states that the expected capital
gains from keeping an additional barrel of oil in the ground must equal the return from extracting, selling and earning
interest on it (Hotelling, 1931). We now extend this rule for volatile oil and ﬁnancial asset prices.
5.1. Optimal rates of oil extraction
Since the data suggest that the oil price is positively correlated with ﬁnancial assets, we proceed under this
assumption.24 Without loss of generality we assume that the oil price can be perfectly hedged with a single ﬁnancial asset k,
dZO ¼ dZk. The policy maker chooses the consumption rate C, the rate of oil extraction O, and asset weights wi, i ¼1, .., m to
maximize expected welfare,
JðF; PO; S; tÞ ¼max
C;wi ;O
Et
Z 1
s
U CðsÞð Þeρðs tÞds
 
; ð16Þ
subject to the budget constraint:
dF ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiðαirÞFdtþ rFþΩðPO;OÞC½ dtþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiFσidZi; ð17Þ24 Empirically the extent of this correlation varies over time, as is expected when the source of the oil price shock matters (Kilian, 2009). We abstract
from this complication here.
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Fig. 5. Endogenous oil extraction.
T. van den Bremer et al. / European Economic Review 82 (2016) 113–131 121the Geometric Brownian Motion processes for asset prices (3) and oil prices (4), and the reserve depletion equation
dS
dt
¼ OðtÞ; ð18Þ
where oil rents are revenues minus extraction costs, ΩðPO;OÞ  POOGðOÞ; and total extraction costs are increasing in the
extraction rate (G'ðOÞ40) and convex to ensure a solution (G''ðOÞ40) (cf., Pindyck, 1984) exists. Practically, the assumption
of convexity corresponds to costs of extraction for a decision maker at a national level increasing more than proportionally
when the rate of extraction is increased. 25 From the depletion Eq. (18), cumulative oil extraction cannot exceed initial
reserves,
R1
0 OðtÞdtrS0: It can be shown (see appendix A.5) that the optimal path for the expected rate of oil extraction
satisﬁes the modiﬁed Hotelling rule:
1
dt E dΩO
 ¼ rΩOþ  1dt E dJFdΩO
 
JF ðF; PO; S; tÞ
 !
: ð19Þ
In the particular case of quadratic extraction costs, GðOÞ ¼ γO2=2; γ40; the stochastic path for oil extraction can be
approximated by (for αO ¼ 0):
dO 1γ rþσOσk ðαkrÞ

 
POþ rþ12 σOσk ðαkrÞ

 
O

 
dtþ12OσOdZO: ð20Þ
The stochastic Hotelling rule (19) states that the expected change in marginal oil rents must equal the return on safe
assets plus a risk premium. Since we assume that oil and ﬁnancial asset returns co-move positively, this premium is positive.
High oil prices drive high marginal oil rents, which are associated with high fund values, F, and low marginal utility from an
extra dollar in the fundð 1dt E dJFdΩO
 
o 0). The higher return compensates for the risk of holding oil in the ground (equal
to 1dt Et dJFdΩO
 
=ðJFΩOÞ). If oil and asset markets are uncorrelated ð 1dt E dJFdΩO
 ¼ 0), all oil price risk can be diversiﬁed and
no risk premium is needed. The more correlated oil and asset markets are, the less oil price shocks can be diversiﬁed and the
higher the risk premium. Fig. 5 shows that oil price volatility implies that it is optimal to extract oil initially more quickly. As
the rate of extraction drops, extraction costs fall non-linearly boosting the marginal return on oil extraction.
Eq. (20) indicates that the optimal rate of oil extraction is positively correlated with the oil price, so that a sudden jump
in the oil price requires a jump in the extraction rate to make the most of it. Oil price shocks affect the rate of extraction
most when reserves (and in turn O) are highest, since this is when the majority of oil remains exposed to volatile prices. As
the date of exhaustion approaches, the rate of oil extraction gets closer to what it would be without volatile oil and asset
prices. Note that the size of the fund does not matter for the optimal rate of oil extraction, only the properties of the assets in
the background.
Our ﬁnding that stochastic oil prices increase the oil extraction rate is consistent with earlier studies, but uses a different
mechanism. Earlier work ignored ﬁnancial assets and relied on “extractive prudence” driven by sufﬁciently convex marginal
extraction costs, G'''ðOÞ40 (Pindyck, 1981).26 This means it is better to extract oil quickly because, once it is above ground
and sold, it is no longer exposed to risk. By restricting our attention to quadratic extraction costs (G'''ðOÞ ¼ 0), we deliberately
rule out this type of prudence. In our framework oil rents are still exposed to risk above the ground as they must be25 In practice, oil ﬁelds evolve stochastically as new ﬁelds are discovered and existing ﬁelds become economical (e.g., Pindyck, 1978). Extraction costs
might be better captured by high upfront investment and small marginal costs. Reserves are also endogenous to exploration effort, but we abstract from
these complications here.
26 Aggressive oil extraction also occurs with convex marginal utility arising from market power (van der Ploeg, 2010).
T. van den Bremer et al. / European Economic Review 82 (2016) 113–131122invested. Hence, oil should be treated as just another part of the total portfolio. The effect of risk on extraction is driven by
“extractive risk aversion” (G''ðOÞ) rather than by extractive prudence (G'''ðOÞ) and so poses less onerous restrictions on
extraction costs. Recent literature separates extraction and drilling decisions (e.g. Anderson et al., 2014). These models also
display concavity in either or both choice variable, so risk from above-ground ﬁnancial markets will still speed up the
optimal rate of extraction.27
5.2. Sovereign wealth funds with endogenous rates of oil extraction
With complete markets and without investment restrictions oil rents can be fully hedged by the fund, regardless of the
path of oil extraction. This involves continuously adjusting the asset allocation so that the net exposure to risk remains a
constant share of total above- and below-ground wealth. With complete markets oil wealth can be replicated with a bundle
comprising the perfectly correlated asset k and the safe asset n, and the value of this bundle evolves according to (see
appendix A.6 for a proof):
dVðtÞþΩðtÞdt ¼ rVðtÞþðαkrÞωkðO; tÞVðtÞ½ dtþωkðO; tÞVðtÞσkdZkðtÞ; ð21Þ
where ωkðO; tÞ ¼NkPk=V is the continuously adjusted share of asset k in the replicating bundle. Total wealth evolves
according to:
dW ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
ðαirÞwiWþðrWCÞdtþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
σiwiWdZi; ð22Þ
where
wi ¼wi FðtÞ=WðtÞ
 
iak; wk ¼wkðtÞ FðtÞ=WðtÞ
 þωkðO; tÞ VðtÞ=WðtÞ : ð23Þ
Oil rents are no longer a Geometric Brownian Motion as in Section 3, but driven by the drift μΩðPO; S; tÞdt and volatility
σΩðPO; S; tÞdZO:
dΩ¼ μΩðPO; S; tÞdtþσΩðPO; S; tÞdZO: ð24Þ
The drift and volatility of oil rents are replicated by continuously reallocating the bundle of the perfectly correlated risky
asset and the safe asset as PO and S change. Holdings of asset k in the bundle are adjusted so that the change in oil rents,
σΩðPO; S; tÞdZO, is matched by that in the bundle, ωkðO; tÞXðtÞσkdZk. The share of the safe asset is chosen so that the
instantaneous drifts also match. As before, the fund is managed to ensure that net exposure to each ﬁnancial asset is a
constant share of total wealth: wi ¼ δiwi; i¼ 1; ::;m. Any exposure to asset k embodied in oil, ωkðO; tÞ, is offset by the asset’s
weight in the fund, wkðtÞ, so that the net weight in total wealth is constant. By rearranging (23) holdings of each asset in the
fund can, as before, be split up into a leveraged and a hedging component for the perfectly correlated asset k:
wi ¼wi
FþV
F
 
; iak; wkðtÞ ¼ wkþwk
V
F
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
leveraged demand
þ ωkðO; tÞ
V
F
  
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
hedging demand
: ð25Þ
As the asset allocation and consumption problems can be expressed in terms of total wealth (22), propositions 2 and
3 apply. Judicious management of the fund allows consumption to be smoothed in line with the permanent income
hypothesis and to buffer consumption from oil price volatility by hedging it with traded ﬁnancial assets.6. Policy implications: Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global
The policies of Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) 28 closely follow standard CAPM recommendations
ignoring oil wealth. Firstly, the GPFG uses the FTSE Global All Cap Index as the equity benchmark (with around 7,400
individual stocks, a close approximation of the market).29 This is consistent with holding the optimal risky (or market)
portfolio in (8) if W ¼ F instead of W ¼ F þ V. Secondly, the Ministry of Finance chooses the equity/bond mix, and in 2007
moved from 40/60% to 60/40%, as it was willing to accept more risk for a higher return. This is consistent with choosing the
size of the risky portfolio based on preferences and the overall risk and return of the market, as in (9) with W¼F. Thirdly, a
ﬁxed share of the fund (4% according to Norway’s handlingsregelen) is consumed each year, as in (12) with W¼F.27 Other work estimates oil price volatility from options data and ﬁnds that it delays investment in Texas oil wells (Kellogg, 2014). However, this relies
on a real options argument, whereas we focus on risk aversion and hedging.
28 At US$840 billion the GPFG is the largest single fund in existence, which was established in 1990 to smooth expenditure ﬁnanced from oil after a
period of ﬁscal volatility in the 1970s and 1980s. Evaluating governance, accountability and transparency, structure and behavior, the GPFG ranked ﬁrst on
the ﬁrst two criteria and second overall, behind Alaska’s US$45 billion permanent fund (Truman, 2008), and received the highest rating on the Linaburg-
Maduell Transparency Index (SWF Institute, 2013). It has been called a “model” for sovereign wealth funds (Chambers, et al., 2012; Larsen, 2005).
29 The benchmark is 60% equities, tracking the FTSE Global All Cap Index; up to 5% real estate, tracking the Investment Property Databank’s Global
Property Benchmark; and up to 40% bonds, of which 70% government and 30% corporate bonds, both tracking Barclays indices.
T. van den Bremer et al. / European Economic Review 82 (2016) 113–131 123GPFG’s management mandate does not mention oil wealth at all (NBIM, 2013), thus leaving Norway exposed to its large
and volatile stock of oil wealth: the “elephant in the ground”.30 Norway, and other oil-rich countries with similar funds,
would beneﬁt by letting the asset allocation and the consumption rule in the GPFG vary over time.
Norway’s asset allocation should vary over time to hedge as much of the volatility of remaining subsoil oil as possible.31
In the ﬁrst-best case described in Section 3 this would involve taking large long positions in some industries, and large short
positions in others (that may exceed the size of the fund), and reversing these positions as oil is extracted. Such highly
leveraged positions expose the country to substantial risk if there are systematic shocks (Das and Uppal, 2004). They may
also become illiquid, which invalidates the assumption of exogenous prices. Furthermore, the short positions assume that
the covariance matrix is stable over time. In practice correlations between oil and each sector vary depending on the type of
shock hitting the world economy (Kilian, 2009). As these correlations can only be estimated using past data and the size of
the hedging positions are so large, there is the potential for large basis risk between oil and the hedging portfolio. Finally, as
oil is extracted the highly leveraged positions must be reversed which will incur substantial transaction costs for a large
fund.32 Therefore the target index should not be rebalanced too frequently and portfolios should only be adjusted gradually.
A more pragmatic, second-best approach to asset allocation might be to only vary the equity/bonds mix.33 This would be
transparent and easy to explain to investors and the public. It would also notrequire short positions, have lower transaction
costs, and would not rely on a large, time-varying correlation matrix covering all market assets. In this approach, the only
risky asset is the overall equity market (e.g., the FTSE Global All Cap Index). If oil is sufﬁciently positively correlated with this
market, the hedging demand to offset oil risk will exceed the leverage demand.34 In this case, the GPFG should hedge the
exposure of subsoil reserves to oil price risk by holding fewer equities and more safe assets while there is oil in the ground.
Over time the oil reserves will be depleted and the exposure to equities embodied in subsoil oil will fall. This allows the
above ground fund’s equity exposure to rise, so that equities make up a greater share of the portfolio as oil is extracted.
The consumption rule should be a constant share of total assets, and thus should fall as a share of the fund as oil is
extracted. If oil price risk is perfectly hedged as described in Section 3, this rule should hold exactly. If hedging is imperfect,
as would happen by only varying the equity/bond mix, slightly more precautionary savings would be needed. More pre-
cautionary saving is also needed if the fund faces a short-sales constraint. Recently, the fund has stopped investing in coal
and oil stocks. If the aim is to hedge subsoil oil, it should go further by taking short positions in oil, gas and other stocks that
are positively correlated with oil prices. If the aim is to protect the environment, spending should be curtailed to build up a
buffer against less diversiﬁed risks. In general though, spending as a share of the fund should fall over time as above-ground
assets account for an increasing share of total wealth.
These recommendations are relevant for the current debate in Norway. The fund excludes investments in certain assets
for social and political reasons, such as tobacco and defense ﬁrms, and early 2015 also in assets affected by climate change
and other environmental concerns such as coal, oil sands, cement and gold mining. In late 2014 Norway also established a
government commission to assess its 4% spending rule due to concerns about excessive ﬁscal stimulus (Ministry of Finance
2014b). This follows declining spending as a share of GPFG assets, from nearly 6% in 2010 to below 3% in 2014, and there
have been calls to limit spending to 3% in the future (Olsen, 2014).7. Concluding remarks
Commodity exporters have two major types of national assets: natural resources below the ground and a sovereign
wealth fund above it. Although some attempts to hedge commodity price volatility have been made, from long-term for-
ward agreements in iron ore until 2010 to the purchase of oil options by Mexico in 2008, there is no evidence of systematic
coordination of below- and above-ground assets. We have made the case for coordinating the management of these two
types of asset by integrating the theories of portfolio allocation, precautionary saving, and optimal oil extraction under oil
and asset price volatility.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. Firstly, commodity exporters should change the allocation of their sovereign wealth
fund by leveraging all risky assets and hedging subsoil oil risk. These effects are proportional to the ratio of oil and fund
wealth, so unwind as resource reserves are depleted. Secondly, consumption should be a constant share of total oil and fund
wealth. This stabilizes the mean and variance of spending as total wealth evolves steadily whilst oil reserves are replaced by
ﬁnancial assets, but relies on the degree to which the oil price can be hedged by components of the above-ground portfolio.30 Norway has proven reserves of nearly 9 billion barrels of oil and 73 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (BP, 2014). At 2013 prices these are worth US$
945 billion and US$ 777 billion, respectively.
31 Empirical simulations using the correlation of oil prices with ﬁnancial assets indicate that Norway’s exposure to aggregate oil price volatility is
halved if oil wealth is hedged in the sovereignwealth fund (Gintschel and Scherer, 2008) and that the fund invests less aggressively in risky assets as it ages
(Scherer, 2009; Balding and Yao, 2011). These studies focus on asset allocation but abstract from optimal consumption-saving decisions or oil extraction.
32 See a recent report to the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) (Ministry of Finance, 2014a).
33 Gintschel and Scherer (2008) impose short-sale constraints. This does not address the transactions costs that funds face by continuously rebalancing
or potentially unstable correlations between assets.
34 The correlation between the oil price and the overall equity market will also vary over time, though it will be more stable than a covariance matrix
covering all 7,400 assets in the FTSE Global All Cap Index. Varying correlations will alter how quickly the equity share in the fund rises. Future work could
account for this using regime-switching (cf. Ang and Bekaert, 2002).
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savings in the face of the additional unhedgeable risk that remains. Fourthly, the rate of oil extraction should be faster than
predicted by the standard Hotelling rule if oil prices are volatile and positively correlated with ﬁnancial markets. This
generates a risk premium on subsoil oil, as convex extraction costs will fall faster than the rate of extraction. The size of the
premium will depend on oil’s correlation with the market, and disappears to zero if their returns are independent.
Our analysis attempts to offer a ﬁrst step towards an integrated approach to managing sovereign wealth funds and
natural resources under uncertainty. To do this we combine canonical models of asset allocation, precautionary savings and
oil extraction. These models, while widely used and theoretically appealing, have received empirical criticism (Grifﬁn, 1985;
Jones, 1990; Fama and French, 2004; Anderson at al., 2014). Future work can address this along three dimensions. The ﬁrst is
to analyze the effect of ﬁnancial assets on natural resources in more detail, allowing for the exploration and discovery of
new reserves35, and extraction decisions at the discrete well level (Kellogg, 2014; Anderson, et al., 2014; Venables, 2014).
The second is to extend the analysis to include other non-ﬁnancial assets such as domestic non-traded capital, human
capital and pension liabilities, absorption constraints, general equilibrium effects of spending resource revenues,36 and the
beneﬁts from structural reform to make the economy less vulnerable to commodity price volatility. Finally, there is scope for
modelling oil and asset prices in more detail. In practice prices exhibit mean reversion (Wachter, 2002), stochastic volatility
(Chacko and Viceira, 2005; Fouque et al., 2013), large jumps (Ngwira and Gerrard, 2007) and time-varying correlations
(Bollerslev et al., 1988; Longin and Solnik, 1995). Although these extensions allow a better empirical testing of our results,
we conjecture that the qualitative nature of our policy insights will be unaffected.Appendix A Derivations
A.1. Valuing oil with exogenous oil extraction
Asset returns are assumed to be normally distributed and can be expressed as a linear combination of m independent
shocks, dZ¼Λ* du* where du* is anm x 1 vector. If the oil price is completely spanned by the market, it can be expressed as a
linear combination of these m shocks: dZO¼ΛO* du*. Now, in order to study incomplete markets, remove one asset from the
investment set. The returns on the remaining m1 assets can now be expressed as a linear combination of m1 (different)
independent shocks, dZ¼Λ du where du is an (m1) x 1 vector. If oil returns are expressed in terms of these shocks, there is
a residual part that is uncorrelated with the market, dZO ¼λOh duh þ ΛO du, as in (5). Although the asset that is removed
from the investment set may be correlated with other assets, the unhedgeable component of the oil price is not. Here we are
concerned with valuing subsoil oil and so ignore investment restrictions. Any asset that is outside the investment set can
still be observed and can be used to value oil wealth. The value thus derived is a market value. Taking Eq. (5) with λOh ¼ 0, we
can express the oil price as:
POðtÞ ¼ POð0ÞexpðϕtÞ Π
m
i ¼ 1
PiðtÞ
Pið0Þ
 βi
; ðA1Þ
with ϕ α0þ
Pm
i ¼ 1
βi αi12σ2i
 þ12 Pm
i ¼ 1
Pm
j ¼ 1
βiβjσijand βi  σOMi=σi; Mi  ΛOΛ1
 
i,
which can be readily veriﬁed using Ito’s lemma and comparing coefﬁcients with (4).
Lemma A1. With complete markets, the capitalized value of oil income is:
VðPO; tÞ ¼ POðtÞOðtÞ=ψ ; ψ  rþκαOþ
Xm
i ¼ 1 βiðαirÞ: ðA2Þ
Derivation. Firstly, we construct a portfolio with value V (P1, .., Pm, t) which consists of assets 1, .., n that is identical to the
capitalized value of oil and distributes an amount of cash equal to POðtÞOðtÞ per unit time. This value evolves according to:
dV ¼ ðμVVPOOÞdtþσVVdZV : ðA3Þ
With the aid of Ito’s lemma the dynamics of the portfolio can be written as:
dV ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
VidPiþVtdtþ
1
2
Xm
i ¼ 1
Xm
j ¼ 1
VijdPidPj
¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
αiV iPiþVtþ
1
2
Xm
i ¼ 1
Xm
j ¼ 1
σijVijPiPj
2
4
3
5dtþXm
i ¼ 1
σiV iPidZi; ðA4Þ35 This would extend Pindyck (1978) to a setting with ﬁnancial assets in order to understand how hedging oil price exposure affects exploration effort.
36 Gaudet and Khadr (1991) and Atewamba and Gaudet (2012) allow for assets and capital scarcity.
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μVVPOO¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
αiPiViþVtþ
1
2
Xm
i ¼ 1
Xm
j ¼ 1
σijV ijPiPj; σVVdZV ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
σiPiVidZi: ðA5Þ
Finally, let dZV ¼ ΛVdu. This implies:
σVdZV ¼ σVΛVdu¼ Γ0dZ ¼ Γ0Λdu; Γ  V1σ1P1=V ; ::;VmσmPm=V
 
: ðA6Þ
Secondly, we create another portfolio with value X(t) that consists of oil wealth V(t), the risky assets and the safe asset.
This portfolio is dynamically constructed, so short positions offset long positions, there is no net risk, and the net value of
the portfolio is always zero. Hence, the weight of the safe asset in total wealth is wr ¼ wV
Pm
i ¼ 1 wi;where wV is the
weight of oil in total wealth. The return to this portfolio is:
dX ¼wV
dVþPOOdt
V
 
þ
Xm
i ¼ 1
wi
Pi
P
 
þwrrdt
¼ wvðμVrÞþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiðαirÞ
" #
dtþwVσVdZVþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiσidZi
¼ wvðμVrÞþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiðαirÞ
" #
dtþwVΓ0ΛduþΨΛdu; ðA7Þ
where the second equality follows from (A3), the third equality from (A6) and Ψ  ½w1σ1; ::;wmσm': Suppose that the
weights in this new portfolio are dynamically constructed so that there is no risk: wVΓ'ΛduþΨΛdu¼ 0 and the last two
terms in the last equality of (A7) vanish. The weights that would achieve this are wi ¼ ðVi=VÞPiwV ; i¼ 1; ::;m: Arbitrage
dictates that such a constructed portfolio must have a zero expected excess return over the risk-free rate:
0¼wV ðμVrÞþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiðαirÞ; VðμvrÞ ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
ViPiðαirÞ: ðA8Þ
Combining (A8) with (A5) gives the following optimality condition:
1
2
Xm
i ¼ 1
Xm
j ¼ 1
σijPiPjVijþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
rPiVirVþVtþPOO¼ 0: ðA9Þ
Thirdly, the proposed capitalized value of oil income and associated partials,
VðPO; tÞ ¼
1
ψ
POð0ÞexpðϕtÞ Π
m
i ¼ 1
PiðtÞ
Pið0Þ
 βi
Oð0ÞexpðκtÞ; Vi ¼
βiV
Pi
;
Vt ¼ ϕV ; Vii ¼
βiðβi1ÞV
Pi
2 ; Vij ¼
βiβjV
PiPj
; j¼ 1; ::;m; i¼ 1; ::;m; ðA10Þ
satisfy (A9) by substitution. Lemma A1 thus gives capitalized oil income.
Lemma A1 establishes (6). The instantaneous rate of change in the value of oil income is found by applying Ito’s lemma to
this equation to give:
POOdtþdV ¼ rþ
Xm
i ¼ 1
βiðαirÞ
" #
VdtþσOVdZO: ðA11Þ
The result in (7) follows from substituting (A11), (2), and (5) with λO;h ¼ 0 into the expression for total wealth, dW¼dF þ
dV. With an investment restriction on asset m, the derivation for the value of the windfall is analogous and (A1) still holds.
Asset m is then replaced by the unspanned component of the oil price h and βh ¼ σO=σh
 
λOh.
A.2. Asset allocation with exogenous oil extraction
Here we derive the optimal portfolio weights in a sovereign wealth fund in the presence of oil, with and without
investment restrictions based on Merton (1990). We begin by restricting investment in asset h, so λOha0 and the fund holds
m1 securities. The unspanned component of the oil price is uncorrelated with other assets:
dPh ¼ αhPhdtþσhPhduh; ðA12Þ
Note that m was a traded asset that was correlated with all other assets. Above-ground wealth is accumulated according
to (2). We obtain:
dF ¼
Xm1
i ¼ 1
wiF αirð Þdtþ rFþPOOCð Þdtþ
Xm1
i ¼ 1
wiFσidZi
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Xm1
i ¼ 1
βi αirð Þþβh αhrð Þ
 !
VdtþσOV MdZþλO;hduO
 
: ðA13Þ
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is:
max
wi ;C
U Cð Þeρtþ 1dt Et dJðF;V ; tÞ
  ¼ 0; ðA14Þ
1
dt Et dJ
 ¼ Jtþ JF Xm1
i ¼ 1
wiF αirð ÞþrFþPOOC
 !
þ JVFVF
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiβjσij
þ JV rþ
Xm1
i ¼ 1
βi αirð Þþβh αhrð Þ
 !
VPOO
 !
þ1
2
JFFF
2
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiwjσijþ
1
2
JVVV
2
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
βiβjσijþσ2Oλ2O;0
2
4
3
5: ðA15Þ
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to C and wi are:
U0 Cð Þeρt JF ¼ 0) JF ¼ U0 Cð Þeρt ðA16Þ
JFF αirð Þþ JFFF2
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wjσijþ JFVFV
Xm1
j ¼ 1
βjσij ¼ 0: ðA17Þ
Equation (A17) gives the optimal weights in the fund:
wi ¼ 
JF
FJFF
Xm1
j ¼ 1
νij αjr
  JFV
JFF
V
F
βi ¼
C=F
∂C=∂F
θ
Xm1
j ¼ 1
νij αjr
 ∂C=∂V
∂C=∂F
V
F
βi: ðA18Þ
If markets are complete, ∂C=∂F ¼ ∂C=∂V ¼ ∂C=∂W ¼MPC from (12). If markets are incomplete, instead of solving the
arising partial differential equations numerically, we approximate these partials from the complete markets case or,
alternatively, assume that consumption is a linear function of total wealth. With and without investment restrictions we
then obtain:
wi ¼
W
F
θ
Xm1
j ¼ 1
νij αjr
 V
F
βi: ðA19Þ
Deﬁning wiW wiFþβiV , rearranging (A19) gives (8) and (10).
A.3. Optimal consumption with exogenous oil extraction
If markets are complete we can ﬁnd a closed-form solution for the value function JðF;V ; tÞ ¼ JðW  FþV ; tÞ from Merton
(1990). Substituting the ﬁrst-order conditions (A16) and (A17) into the HJB equation (A14) gives:
0¼ 1θ1 expðθρtÞJ1 θW þ JtþrWJW
J2W
JWW
ðαWrÞ2
2σ2W
: ðA20Þ
The closed-form solution to this stochastic partial differential equation is:
JðW ; tÞ ¼ θθ1 expðρtÞ θρðθ1Þη½ 1=θW ðθ1Þ=θ ; η¼ rþθðαWrÞ2=2σ2W : ðA21Þ
(12) follows from substituting (A21) into (A16). Applying Ito’s lemma to (A16):
1
dt Et dJF
 
JF
¼ C''ðCÞ
U0ðCÞ
1
dt Et dC
 
C
ρþ1
2
CU'''ðCÞ
U0ðCÞ
1
dt Et dC
2
h i
C
: ðA22Þ
Using Ito’s lemma we obtain:
dJF ðF;V ; tÞ ¼ JFFdFþ JFVdVþ JFtdtþ12 JFFFdF2þ12 JFVVdV2þ JFFVdFdV : ðA23Þ
In addition the derivative of (A14) with respect to F is:
0¼ JtFþ JFF
Xm1
i ¼ 1
wiF αirð ÞþrFþPOOC
 !
þ JF
Xm1
i ¼ 1
wi αirð Þþr
 !
þ JVF rþ
Xm1
i ¼ 1
βi αirð Þþβh αhrð Þ
 !
VPOO
 !
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2
JFFFF
2
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiwjσijþ JFFF
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiwjσijþ JVFV
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiβjσij
þ1
2
JVVFV
2
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
βiβjσijþσ2Oλ2Oh
2
4
3
5þ JVFFVF Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiβjσij: ðA24Þ
Substituting (A17) and (A23) into (A24) gives:
0¼ 1dt Et dJF
 þ JF r: ðA25Þ
We also have:
1
dt Et dCð Þ
2
h i
¼ C2F 1dt Et dFð Þ
2
h i
þC2V 1dt Et dVð Þ
2
h i
þ2CVCF 1dt Et dVdF
 
; ðA26Þ
1
dt Et dFð Þ
2
h i
¼ F2
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiwjσij; 1dt Et dVdF
 ¼ VF Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiβjσij;
1
dt Et dVð Þ
2
h i
¼ V2
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
βiβjσijþσ2Oλ2Oh
0
@
1
A: ðA27Þ
Combining (A26) and (A27), we obtain:
1
dt
Et dC
2
h i
¼ C2W
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
ðwiFþβiVÞðwjFþβjVÞσijþλ2Ohσ2OV2
2
4
3
5
¼ C2W
Xm1
i ¼ 1
Xm1
j ¼ 1
wiwjσijW
2þλ2Ohσ2OV2
0
@
1
A¼ C2W w2σW2W2þλ2Ohσ2OV2
 ; ðA28Þ
where we use CW  C=W , CW  CF  CV . The stochastic Euler Eqs. (11) and (14) follow from substituting (A25) and (A28)
into (A22). Eq. (11) assumes complete markets, so λOh ¼ 0 and CW ¼ C=W from (12). The result is exact. Eq. (14) assumes
incomplete markets, so λOha0 and we use CW  C=Win order to obtain an approximate solution in the absence of a closed-
form one.
A.4. Complete markets and exogenous oil paths: Epstein-Zin preferences
The results in section 3.3 follow from solving the HJB equation in the undiscounted value function J(F) modiﬁed for
Epstein-Zin preferences (Dufﬁe and Epstein, 1992):
0 ¼ Max
w;C
ρ
11=EIS
C1 1=EIS ð1CRRAÞJðFÞð Þ
1 1=EIS
1 CRRA
ð1CRRAÞJðFÞ½ 
CRRA 1=EIS
1 CRRA
þ ::: þ J0ðFÞ rFCþwðαrÞF½ þ12J″ðFÞw2σ2F2
 
: ðA29Þ
It can be veriﬁed that (A29) has the solution:
JðFÞ ¼ ðΘFÞ
1CRRA
1CRRA ;Θ¼ ρUEISþ rþðαrÞ
2= 2σ2 UCRRA
 h ið1EISÞ
  11 EISρ EISEIS 1: ðA30Þ
A.5. Endogenous oil extraction
The HJB equation for the problem in (16), (17), (3), (4) and (18) is:
0¼max
C;wi ;O
UðCÞeρtþ 1dt Et dJðF; PO; S; tÞ
  
;
1
dt Et dJðF; PO; S; tÞ
 ¼ JF Xm
i ¼ 1
wiðαirÞFþrFCþPOOGðOÞ
" #
þ JPαOPO
 JSOþ Jtþ
1
2
JFFF
2
Xm
i ¼ 1
Xm
j ¼ 1
wiwjσijþ
1
2
JPPσ
2
OP
2
Oþ JFPσOPOF
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiσiρiO: ðA31Þ
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
U0ðCÞeρt ¼ JF ; ðA32Þ
JFFðαirÞþ JFFF2
Xm
j ¼ 1
wjσijþ JFPFσiσOρiOPO ¼ 0 8 i; ðA33Þ
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  JS ¼ 0: ðA34Þ
Differentiating (A31) with respect to the states invoking the envelope theorem
1
dt E dJF
 þ JF rþXm
i ¼ 1
wiðαirÞ
" #
þ JFFF
Xm
i ¼ 1
Xm
j ¼ 1
wiwjσijþ JFPσOPO
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiσiρiO ¼ 0; ðA35Þ
1
dt E dJS
 ¼ 0; ðA36Þ
1
dt E dJP
 þ JFOþ JPαOþ JPPσ2OPOþ JFPFXm
i ¼ 1
wiσiσOρiO ¼ 0: ðA37Þ
Upon substitution of (A33) into (A35), we obtain:
1
dt E dJF
 ¼ rJF : ðA38Þ
Applying Ito’s lemma to (A32) and combining the result with (A38) gives:
1
dt Et dC
 
C
¼ U
0ðCÞ
CU″ðCÞ
 
ðrρÞ CU″
0ðCÞ
U″ðCÞ
  1
dt Et dC
2
h i
C2
: ðA39Þ
Applying Ito’s lemma to (A34) gives:
dJS
JS
¼ dJF
JF
þdΩO
ΩO
þdJFdΩO
JFΩO
; ΩO ¼ POG0ðOÞ: ðA40Þ
Combining (A36), (A38) and (A40) yields (19). Ito’s lemma yields:
dJF ¼ rJFdtþ JFFF
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiσidZiþ JFPPOσOdZO; ðA41Þ
dO¼ μOðF; PO; S; tÞdtþOFF
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiσidZiþOPPOσOdZO; ðA42Þ
where use (A38) and μOðF; PO; S; tÞ ¼ 1=dt
 
Et dO
 
is the to be determined expected rate of growth of the rate of oil
extraction. Applying Ito’s lemma to ΩO ¼ POG'ðOÞ ¼ POγO gives:
dΩO ¼ dPOG″ðOÞdO
1
2
G000ðOÞdO2
¼ αOPOγμOðF; PO; S; tÞ
 
dtγOFF
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiσidZiþð1γOPÞPOσOdZO; ðA43Þ
with G000ðOÞ ¼ 0 for quadratic costs. Multiplying (A41) and (A43) gives:
dJFdΩO
JFΩO
¼ γOFF
JFΩO
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiσi JFPσOPOρiOþ JFFF
Xm
j ¼ 1
wjσjρij
2
4
3
5
8<
:
9=
;dt
þð1γOPÞPOσO
JFΩO
JFPPOσOþ JFFF
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiσiρiO
 !
dt: ðA44Þ
Substituting (A33) for all assets (the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side) and for the perfectly correlated asset k (ρkO ¼ 1, the
second term) gives:
dJFdΩO
JFΩO
¼ 1
ΩO
γOFF
Xm
i ¼ 1
wiðαirÞð1γOPÞ
αkr
σk
 
POσO
" #
dt: ðA45Þ
Substituting (A43) and (A45) into (19) gives:
dΩO ¼ rΩOdtγOF
Xm
i ¼ 1
ðαirÞdtþσidZi
 
wiFþð1γOPÞ ðαkrÞdtþσkdZO
 
PO
σO
σk
: ðA46Þ
Result. If all prices are deterministic, _ΩO ¼ rΩO. If the oil price is also without drift, αO ¼ 0, the date of exhaustion is
T ¼ 1r lnðγOð0Þ=POð0ÞÞ and the optimal rate of oil extraction is to leading-order approximation:
OðtÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2rγ SðtÞPOðtÞ
q
: ðA47Þ
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to give:
OðtÞ ¼ Oð0Þertþ1γ POð0Þ eαOtert
 
: ðA48Þ
We exclude αOZr as price growth would delay extraction indeﬁnitely. Provided ΩOð0Þ40 and, αOor, the extraction rate
remains ﬁnite. The optimal initial extraction rate satisﬁes, SðtÞ ¼ R Tt OðτÞdτ, and the date of exhaustion Tmust satisfy O(T)¼0.
The date of exhaustion only has an explicit solution if αO ¼ 0:
T ¼ 1r lnð1RÞ; ðA49Þ
Sð0Þ ¼  1rγ POð0Þ lnð1RÞþRð Þ; ðA50Þ
where 0oR¼ γOð0Þ=POð0Þo1 is small. As (A50) only deﬁnes the initial rate of extraction, Oð0Þ ¼ f ðSð0Þ; POð0ÞÞ, we use
asymptotic methods to ﬁnd a series-solution and get the leading-order effect. Since  lnð1RÞ ¼ P1n ¼ 1 1n Rn we obtain
rγSð0Þ
POð0Þ
¼
X1
n ¼ 2
Rn
n
: ðA51Þ
This can be inverted to give:
OðtÞ ¼ SðtÞ
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
ξðtÞ123 þ 19 ﬃﬃ2p ξðtÞþ 2135 ξðtÞ2þ 1540 ﬃﬃ2p ξðtÞ3þoðξðtÞ4Þh i; ðA52Þ
whereξðtÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rγSðtÞ=POðtÞ
p
and the coefﬁcients stem from the series inversion and are independent of parameters. The
leading order yields (A47). Lemma A2 gives:
∂O=∂F ¼ 0; ∂O=∂PO ¼O=ð2POÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rS=ð2γPOÞ
p
: ðA53Þ
Assuming the effect of uncertainty is modest, we use these partial derivatives in the analogous problem (analogous to
taking the leading-order terms in a perturbation expansion in the volatility of the oil price). Substituting these partials into
(A46) gives:
dΩO ¼ rΩOdtþðPOγ12OÞ
σO
σk
ðαkrÞdtþσkdZO
 
: ðA54Þ
Combining (A43) and (A54) and setting αO¼0 as in (A46) gives:
1
dt E dO
 ¼ μOðF; PO; S; tÞ ¼ 1γ rþσOσk ðαkrÞ
 POþ rþ12 σOσk ðαkrÞ
 O: ðA55Þ
Eq. (20) is found by substituting (A55) into (A42) and solving the initial value problem subject to the exhaustion con-
dition Oðt ¼ TÞ ¼ Sðt ¼ TÞ ¼ 0. To obtain the results in Fig. 5, we use the full series solution in (A51), which becomes exact in
the limit of an inﬁnite number of terms.
A.6. Asset allocation with endogenous oil extraction
Endogenous oil rents can be replicated with a bundle of Nk shares of asset k and Nr shares of the safe asset, X  Nk Pk þ
Nr Pr. This replicating bundle can be constructed as follows. To ﬁnance the dividend, the price must increase or shares must
be sold:
Ωdt ¼
X
i ¼ k;rdNidPiþdNiPi ðA56Þ
Eq. (21) combines this expression for the dividends with the path for the replicating bundle. By Ito’s lemma the repli-
cating bundle must satisfy:
dXþΩdt ¼
X
i ¼ k;r NidPiþdNidPiþdNiPið ÞþΩdt
¼
X
i ¼ k;r NidPið Þ ¼ωkXðαkrÞdtþrXdtþωkXσkdZk: ðA57Þ
where ωkðtÞ NkðtÞPkðtÞ=XðtÞ. The weights ωk(t) are updated continuously to match the stochastic path of oil rents (A46).
As oil wealth and the replicating bundle have the same properties they must also have the same value, X¼V, giving (21). We
have focused on dV(t) þ Ω(t)dt. V(t) is found using contingent claims (Merton, 1990) if oil rents follow the Ito process
dΩðtÞ ¼ að:ÞΩdtþsð:ÞΩdZO and a(.) and s(.) are not constants. The value of oil rents must be that of the replicating bundle, V
(t)¼X(t). Eq. (22) states that the problem can be summarized in terms of W(t)¼F(t) þ V(t). Combining (17) and (A57) gives
(22). The weight of asset k in the fund adjusts continuously so that the net weight of oil in total wealth is constant. The
weight of all other assets in the fund remains constant, as in (23).References
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